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I. INTRODUCTION
In November 1999, Washington state voters enacted Initiative
Number 695 (1-695), the high-profile ballot measure designed to
reduce vehicle license fees and to require voter approval for future tax
and fee increases.1 Shortly thereafter, Washington Superior Court
Judge Robert Alsdorf invalidated the initiative.2 Tim Eyman, 1-695's
sponsor, was enraged. "[O]ne guy with a robe on, but he might as
well be wearing a crown if he's going to act like a king."'  In fact,
Judge Alsdorf wielded a powerful scepter and committed a sweeping
counter-majoritarian act. One solitary judge, and after him, eight
justices of the Washington Supreme Court,4 overturned the will of
nearly a million Washington voters. 5
* Doctoral candidate, Department of Political Science, University of California at Berkeley
(Ph.D expected 2001); J.D., Harvard University; B.A., Pomona College. I wish to thank
Professor Bruce E. Cain and the staff of the Institute of Governmental Studies at U.C. Berkeley
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1. Act effective Jan. 1, 2000, ch. 1, 2000 Wash. Laws 1 (encoding 1-695). The ballot title
for 1-695 was Shall Voter Approval Be Required for Any Tax Increase, License Tab Fees Be $30
per Year for Motor Vehicles, and Existing Vehicle Taxes Be Repealed? See Office of the
Secretary of State, State of Washington, Initiatives to the People 1999 (Dec. 21, 1999) <http://
www.secstate.wa.gov/inits/people99.htm>. License tab fees in the state had been running
several hundred dollars per year for newer, more expensive cars. David S. Broder, The Ballot
Battle: Initiative Engineers Seem to Be Running Out of Steam, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 3, 2000,
at A20, available in 2000 WL 25425967.
2. See Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587 v. State, No. 99-27054-1, 2000 WL 276126,
at *19 (Wash. Super. Ct., Mar. 14, 2000) (on cross-motions for summary judgment, the district
court judge issued a written decision striking down the initiative in its entirety), affd, Amal-
gamated Transit Union Local 587 v. State, 142 Wash. 2d 183, 11 P.3d 762 (2000).
3. David Postman, 1-695 Ruling Fuels Debate Over Role of Courts, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr.
11, 2000, at B1.
4. See Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587 v. State, 142 Wash. 2d 183, 11 P.3d 762
(2000). Eight Washington Supreme Court Justices voted to affirm the district court's ruling; one
dissented. Id. at 189, 11 P.3d at 763. The majority held that the initiative violated four state
constitutional requirements for initiative lawmaking, including the constitution's requirement
that a bill contain only one subject. Id. at 256-57, 11 P.3d at 806. See also WASH. CONST. art.
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The next year, Washington voters approved 1-722,6 another
Eyman-sponsored tax-cutting initiative known as "Son of 1-695."' In
a ruling from the bench, Thurston County Superior Court Judge
Christine Pomeroy promptly struck down that initiative.8
These rulings followed closely on the heels of the state supreme
court's decision to invalidate 1-573, Washington's 1992 term limit
initiative.9  The two dissenters in that case, Justices Richard B.
Sanders and Gerry L. Alexander, made the point directly: "Today, 6
votes on this court are the undoing of the 1,119,985 votes that
Washingtonians cast at the polls in favor of term limits."1
Invalidation of a citizen initiative is indeed different from our
usual understanding of judicial review, wherein a court overturns the
judgment of a coordinate branch of representative government. 11
Here, Washington courts nullified the decisions of the people them-
selves. While this outcome is remarkable, it is not particularly rare.
Initiatives adopted by Washington voters, like initiatives in other
states, are frequently challenged in court and are often invalidated,
either in part or in their entirety.1 2
This Article describes the high rate at which courts have invali-
dated Washington initiatives and then explores why this is so. The
II, § 19 ("No bill shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title.").
5. According to the Washington Secretary of State, the final vote totals for 1-695 were
992,715 Yes votes and 775,054 No votes. Office of the Secretary of State, State of Washington,
Results of the 1999 Washington State General Election (Dec. 2, 1999) <http://
www.secstate.wa.gov/elections/gen 9 9 .htm>.
6. Office of the Secretary of State, State of Washington, Proposed Initiatives to the People-
2000 (Dec. 2, 1999) <http://www.secstate.wa.gov/inits/people2000.htm> (citing 1-722, Shall
Certain 1999 Tax and Fee Increases Be Nullified, Vehicles Exempted from Property Taxes, and
Property Tax Increases (Except New Construction) Limited to 2% Annually?).
7. David Postman, 1-722 Ruled Unconstitutional, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 24, 2001, at A-1.
8. Id.
9. See Gerberding v. Munro, 134 Wash. 2d 188, 210 & n.l, 949 P.2d 1366, 1377 & n.ll
(1998). The portion of 1-573 restricting terms for members of Congress was earlier invalidated
by a federal court in Thorsted v. Gregoire, 841 F. Supp. 1068 (W.D. Wash. 1994). In 1995, the
United States Supreme Court affirmed that result, holding that a state's efforts to impose term
limits on its members of Congress violates the Qualifications Clause of Article I, Sections 2 and 3
of the United States Constitution. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995)
(striking down Arkansas' congressional term limits initiative and those of other states).
10. Gerberding, 134 Wash. 2d at 231, 949 P.2d at 1388 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
11. See Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1533-34
(1990).
12. Kenneth P. Miller, Judging Ballot Initiatives: A Unique Role for Courts, at 11, Table 3
(Paper presented at the 2000 Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Ass'n, San Jose,
CA, Mar. 23-26, 2000) (on file with the Seattle University Law Review). This study of all voter-
approved statewide initiatives in four states (California, Oregon, Colorado and Washington)
between 1960-1999 reported that of the 163 initiatives approved by voters in those states during
that period, eighty-four were challenged in court (52%). Of those challenged, 54% were inval-
idated in part or in their entirety. Ten cases were still pending.
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Article suggests that it is initiative lawmaking's Populist orientation-
with respect to both its unfiltered majoritarian processes and its often-
constitutionally suspect substance-that makes initiatives vulnerable
to legal attack.
For their part, judges, who wield the sole institutional check on
the initiative process, have to decide how strongly they are going to
exercise that check. They can be what I call "juris-populists" and
accommodate initiative lawmaking, or they can play the role of "initia-
tive watchdogs" and look for ways to strike down initiatives and
constrain the process. As initiative lawmaking has gathered force in
recent years, legal scholars have debated whether courts should apply
a different level of scrutiny to initiatives than to ordinary legislation,
some arguing that initiatives should be scrutinized more aggres-
sively.' 3
Very recently, courts in several states seem to have shifted
discernibly from granting deference to initiatives toward applying
tougher scrutiny. Specifically, several courts are more strictly
applying technical state constitutional restrictions on initiative law-
making, such as single subject rules and ballot title requirements,
invalidating numerous initiatives on these grounds. 4 The Article
suggests that the Washington state courts' invalidation of 1-695 is
consistent with this trend.
If the courts are going to play "watchdog" over the initiative
process, however, they do so at some risk. Many voters are frustrated
when courts overturn popular initiatives and are inclined to agree with
Mr. Eyman's anticourt sentiments." Especially where, as in Wash-
ington, judges are selected in competitive elections, the same Populist
impulse that drives initiative lawmaking can further politicize the
judiciary and threaten its independence.
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF WASHINGTON INITIATIVES
To understand the nature and magnitude of the courts' role in
Washington's initiative process, it is helpful to look at some numbers.
First, Washington is a high-use initiative state.' 6 Since the state insti-
tuted the initiative process in 1912,'" Washingtonians have adopted
13. See infra Section IV.
14. See infra Section V.
15. See Postman, supra note 3, at Al.
16. This Article focuses exclusively on the statewide initiative process. Local initiatives are
an important lawmaking mechanism in many cities and counties, but they fall outside the scope
of this discussion.
17. Adopted in 1889, the Washington State Constitution did not initially contain provi-
sions for initiative or referendum. Article II, section 1 instead provided that "[t]he legislative
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sixty-four statewide initiatives."8 Voters in only four states have
adopted more. Oregon and California have used the initiative process
most actively;19 the second tier of initiative states includes Colorado,
North Dakota, Washington and Arizona.20 By contrast, voters in
Utah, a "low-use" initiative state, have adopted only five initiatives in
their state's history.2' Unlike other high-use initiative states, Wash-
ington has not seen a major surge in initiative lawmaking over the past
few decades. In Oregon, for example, voter-approved initiatives
jumped from zero in the 1960s to twenty-two in the 1990s, and in
California they surged from only three in the 1960s to twenty-four in
the 1990s. 22 By contrast, Washington voters have adopted initiatives
at a near-constant rate over the past four decades: nine in the 1960s,
nine in the 1970s, seven in the 1980s, and eleven in the 1990s. 23
Second, as in other high-use initiative states, Washington's
voter-approved initiatives have frequently faced court challenges. As
of 1999, fifteen of the thirty-six initiatives Washingtonians approved
between 1960 and 1999 (42%) had been challenged in state or federal
powers shall be vested in a senate and house of representatives, which shall be called the
legislature of the state of Washington." WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1. In 1911, however, the
Washington legislature proposed Amendment 7, amending Article II, section 1 to state,
The legislative authority of the state of Washington shall be vested in the legislature,
consisting of a senate and a house of representatives, which shall be called the legisla-
ture of the state of Washington, but the people reserve to themselves the power to
propose bills, laws, and to enact or reject the same at the polls, independent of the
legislature, and also reserve power, at their own option, to approve or reject at the
polls any act, item, section, or part of any bill, act, or law passed by the legislature.
WASH. CONST. art. 11, § 1. The following year, Washington voters approved Amendment 7 and
gained, or "reserved," the power of initiative and referendum. See Jeffrey T. Even, Direct Demo-
cracy in Washington: A Discourse on the People's Powers of Initiative and Referendum, 32 GONZ. L.
REV. 247, 251-52 (1997).
18. See Office of the Secretary of State, State of Washington, Index to Initiative History and
Statistics: 1914-2000 (last modified Feb. 26, 2001) <http://www.secstate.wa.gov/inits/
initstats.htm> (includes Initiatives to the People and Initiatives to the Legislature). See also
Initiative and Referendum Institute Historical Database (visited Apr. 25, 2001) <http://
www.iandrinstitute.org/>.
19. Here, "use" is defined as "adoption" rather than as qualification for the ballot or other
activities, such as pre-petition filing.
20. The numbers of voter-approved initiatives in the highest-use initiative states are as
follows: Oregon (115), California (95), Colorado (77), North Dakota (75), Washington (64),
Arizona (64). Initiative and Referendum Institute Historical Database, supra note 18.
21. Other low-use initiative states include Mississippi (no voter-approved initiatives),
Illinois (one), Wyoming (three), and Florida (ten). Initiative and Referendum Institute Histor-
ical Database, supra note 18.
22. Kenneth P. Miller, The Role of Courts in the Initiative Process: A Search for
Standards, at 12 (Paper presented at the 1999 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Ass'n, Atlanta, GA, Sept. 2-5, 1999) (on file with the Seattle University Law Review).
23. Miller, supra at note 12, at 9, Table 2.
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court-sometimes in both. 24 This challenge rate is similar to Oregon's
(44%, nineteen of forty-three)2 and Colorado's (48%, fourteen of
twenty-nine)26 during the same period. California, the busiest initia-
tive state over the past four decades, also had by far the highest rate of
initiative challenges (65%, thirty-six of fifty-five).2 In all of these
high-use initiative states, including Washington, the sheer number of
challenges and the crucial policy significance of many of the cases have
now fully established courts as an important component of the ini-
tiative process.
Third, the outcomes of cases suggest that courts have played an
important countering and filtering role in Washington's initiative
process. Courts struck down, either in part or in their entirety, 53%
(eight of fifteen) of Washington initiatives challenged in court over the
past four decades.2 The nullified initiatives included major proposals
to impose a mandatory death penalty for first-degree murder;29 restrict
pornography;3" prohibit forced busing for racial integration of
schools;"1 ban storage of out-of-state radioactive waste;32 impose term
limits on state elected officials and members of Congress;3 3 and reduce
vehicle license fees and require voter approval for future tax and fee
increases.34
24. Id.
25. Miller, supra note 22, at 12, Table 5. Note that this percentage will increase as lawyers
file new challenges to long-standing voter-approved constitutional initiatives in the wake of the
Oregon Supreme Court's decision in Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 959 P.2d 49 (Or. 1998). See notes
147-49, infra, and accompanying text. New challenges to long-standing, voter-approved
initiatives could increase litigation percentages in other states as well.
26. Id. at 12, Table 6.
27. Id. at 12, Table 4.
28. Miller, supra note 12, at Appendix 35-41.
29. See State v. Green, 91 Wash. 2d 431, 444-47, 588 P.2d 1370, 1378-79 (1979) (holding
that 1-316 (1975) is invalid because it violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
30. See Spokane Arcades, Inc. v. Ray, 449 F. Supp. 1145, 1158 (E.D. Wash. 1978);
(concluding 1-335 (1977) was a "constitutionally impermissible prior restraint upon freedom of
speech"); State ex rel. Jones v. Charboneau's, 27 Wash. App. 5, 9-11, 615 P.2d 1321, 1324-25
(1980) (holding that the ballot title of 1-335 was insufficient to give the public notice of the
initiative subject matter), overruled by Washington Fed'n of State Employees v. State, 127 Wash.
2d 544, 579, 901 P.2d 1028, 1046 (1995) (holding that the court must consider both the
legislative title and the ballot title in analyzing an initiative under Article II, section 19).
31. See Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982) (invalidating 1-350
(1978)).
32. See Washington State Bldg. Constr. and Trades Council, AFL-CIO v. Spellman, 684
F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1982) (invalidating 1-383 (1980)).
33. See Thorsted v. Gregoire, 841 F. Supp. 1068 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (invalidating 1-573
(1992)).
34. See Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587 v. State, 142 Wash. 2d 183, 11 P.3d 762
(2000) (invalidating 1-695 (1999)).
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III. WHY Do SO MANY INITIATIVES HAVE TROUBLE IN COURT?
We now turn to the question of why? Why are so many voter-
approved initiatives challenged in court, and why are so many invali-
dated? I contend that the primary explanation for the courts' high
level of involvement in initiative lawmaking in Washington (and
elsewhere) lies in the nature of the initiative process itself. Speci-
fically, the Populist conception of initiative lawmaking, which mani-
fests itself both in the process of enacting initiatives and in the
substance of laws enacted thereby, makes ballot measures vulnerable to
legal challenge and invalidation.
I should explain what I mean by the "Populist conception" of
initiative lawmaking, distinguishing it from the competing "Progres-
sive conception."35 The initiative process is often characterized as a
Progressive reform because it was introduced in Washington and most
other initiative states during the "Progressive era" (approximately
1900-1918).36 However, Populists were agitating for adoption of
direct democracy during the last decades of the 19th century, before
the advent of the Progressive era.37  More importantly for this
discussion, Populists and Progressives had different conceptions of the
initiative process.
Progressives respected the representative system and envisioned
the initiative (as well as the referendum and recall) as a way to improve
representative government. For example, Woodrow Wilson, who
came to support the initiative process, maintained that Progressive
advocates of initiative lawmaking had no intention of undermining
representative or legislative processes, but rather wanted to redeem
them." By contrast, Populists made no secret of the fact that they
35. Professor Bruce E. Cain and I develop this distinction at greater length in Bruce E.
Cain & Kenneth P. Miller, The Populist Legacy: Initiatives and the Undermining of Representative
Government, in DANGEROUS DEMOCRACY?: THE BATTLE OVER BALLOT INITIATIVES IN
AMERICA 33, 33-48 (Larry J. Sabato et al. eds., 2001).
36. Twenty-two states adopted the initiative or referendum (or both) between 1898 and
1918. THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, REFER-
ENDUM AND RECALL 51, Table 3.1 (1989). For a discussion of the adoption of the initiative
process and the reasons why initiative lawmaking is largely a western phenomenon, see Nathaniel
A. Persily, The Peculiar Geography of Direct Democracy: Why the Initiative, Referendum and
Recall Developed in the American West, 2 MICH. L. & POL'Y REV. 11 (1997).
37. See CRONIN, supra note 36, at 56; JOHN D. HICKS, THE POPULIST REVOLT: A
HISTORY OF THE FARMERS' ALLIANCE AND THE PEOPLE'S PARTY 406-07 (Univ. Neb. Press
1961)(1931).
38. See CRONIN, supra note 36, at 54. In coordination with their other reforms, the
Progressives sought to use the initiative to enhance the responsiveness, professionalism, compe-
tence, and expertise of government. See also DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION:
VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 21-25 (1984).
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distrusted representative government and saw the initiative as a way to
bypass, constrain, and undermine it.39
Populists and Progressives from that earlier period have succes-
sors today, and the two conceptions of initiative lawmaking continue
to compete. In short, neo-Progressives still seek to use the initiative to
enhance the responsiveness, professionalism, and expertise of govern-
ment, whereas neo-Populists seek to substitute the wisdom of the
people for the deliberations of elected officials.
The Populist position today supports both the increased use of
direct democracy and little or no reform of the initiative process.
Term limit advocates (such as Sherry Bockwinkel)" and tax cutters
(such as Tim Eyman and his counterparts Bill Sizemore in Oregon41
and Doug Bruce in Colorado42) are good examples of contemporary
Populists. They support not only term limits and tax cuts, but also
unconstrained initiative lawmaking, in part because all of these
mechanisms weaken and constrain legislatures, and they believe that
legislatures tend to enact unwanted laws and create wasteful
expenses.43 Moreover, Populists tend to oppose initiative reforms that
would give the legislature the ability to amend or respond to initiatives
in circulation, and they favor the direct over the indirect initiative. As
the initiative process has become more Populist-oriented, modern
Progressives (including "good government" groups like Common
Cause and the League of Women Voters) have become increasingly
ambivalent about initiative lawmaking, seeking reforms to the
process.44 Progressives are right to be concerned, because the Populist
39. See CRONIN, supra note 36, at 59.
40. Bockwinkel sponsored two term limits initiatives in Washington, and has played an
important role in other initiative campaigns. See Joni Balter & Lance Dickey, Initiatives:
Governing by Microwave Populism: The Rise of Instant Gratification Politics, and We're Next,
SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 5, 2000, at B5.
41. Sizemore, the executive director of Oregon Taxpayers United, has sponsored numerous
initiatives in Oregon over the past decade, including six that appeared on the November 2000
ballot. See Brad Knickerbocker, A Man Who Rules by Referendum, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MON-
ITOR, Oct. 20, 2000, at 1.
42. Bruce was the proponent of Colorado Amendment 1 of 1992, the Taxpayer's Bill of
Rights (TABOR), and several other initiatives. See, e.g., Steve Lipsher, Bruce Craves Respect but
Taxes His Critics, DENVER POST, Oct. 26, 1997, at A-25. Eyman, Sizemore, and Bruce are heirs
to the tradition of Howard Jarvis, the California Populist who co-authored California's landmark
1978 property tax limitation initiative, Proposition 13. Jarvis died in 1986, but his impact is still
strongly felt. See generally PETER SCHRAG, PARADISE LOST: CALIFORNIA'S EXPERIENCE,
AMERICA'S FUTURE 188-99 (1998).
43. For a discussion of the imposition of term limits and tax and expenditure limits in
several states, see Caroline J. Tolbert, Changing Rules for State Legislatures: Direct Democracy
and Governance Policies, in CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS: DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED
STATES 171 (Shaun Bowler et al. eds., (1998)).
44. See, e.g., LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF CALIFORNIA, INITIATIVE AND REFEREN-
DUM IN CALIFORNIA: A LEGACY LOST?: A STUDY UPDATE OF DIRECT LEGISLATION IN
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conception of initiative lawmaking has largely prevailed, at least in
most high-use initiative states.45
Is this the case in Washington? Although the initiative process
in Washington is not as Populist-oriented as in some states and has
some important Progressive-oriented structural features, it has never-
theless increasingly been dominated by Populist forces.
It should be emphasized that Washington's initiative process has
three important features that orient initiative lawmaking in a Progres-
sive rather than a Populist direction. First, Washington does not
allow initiatives to amend the state's constitution.46 This restriction
makes it more difficult for Populist-minded initiative sponsors to bind
and undermine representative government. Washington voters' ina-
bility to impose term limits on elected officials without amending the
state constitution is an example of how this rule places limits on
Populist action.47
In addition, Washington permits the legislature to amend voter-
approved initiatives.45 Specifically, for two years after the initiative's
enactment, legislative amendments require a two-thirds vote of both
houses.49 After two years, like any other law, an initiative can be
amended or repealed by a simple majority vote in the legislature and
the executive's signature. This feature prevents Populists from using
CALIFORNIA FROM PROGRESSIVE HOPES TO PRESENT REALITY (1998).
45. See Cain & Miller, supra note 35, at 39-42.
46. The Washington Constitution, Article II, section 41 reads in pertinent part as follows:
"The legislative authority of the state of Washington shall be vested in the legislature .... but
the people reserve to themselves the power to propose bills, laws, and to enact or reject the same
at the polls, independent of the legislature. ." WASH. CONST. art II, § 41 No provision is
made for constitutional amendment by initiative. Obviously, this is an important restriction, and
initiative advocates have argued that the constitution can be amended by initiative. See, e.g.,
Postman, supra note 3, at B1. The Washington Supreme Court, however, has consistently
rejected this view. See, e.g., Gerberding v. Munro, 134 Wash. 2d 188, 210, 949 P.2d 1366, 1377
(1998) ("We have often stated that the initiative process, as a means by which the people can
exercise directly the legislative authority to enact bills and laws, is limited in scope to subject
matter which is legislative in nature.") (citations omitted). See also Even, supra note 17, at 268,
270.
47. See Gerberding, 134 Wash. 29 at 211, 949 P.2d at 1377.
48. See WASH. CONST. art II, § 1(c).
49. The Washington Constitution, Article II, section 1(c) reads as follows:
No act, law, or bill approved by a majority of the electors voting thereon shall be
amended or repealed by the legislature within a period of two years following such
enactment: Provided, That any such act, law, or bill may be amended within two years
after such enactment at any regular or special session of the legislature by a vote of
two-thirds of all the members elected to each house with full compliance with section
12, Article III, of the Washington Constitution, and no amendatory law adopted in
accordance with this provision shall be subject to referendum. But such enactment
may be amended or repealed at any general regular or special election by direct vote of
the people thereon.
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initiatives to place permanent restrictions on legislative action. It
contrasts with the super-populist California rule, under which
statutory initiatives can be cast in stone, i.e., the legislature can never
amend or repeal them without voter approval."0
Third, unlike other high-use initiative states, Washington pro-
vides the option of the indirect initiative. 51 In theory, this mechanism,
known in Washington as "initiative to the legislature," engages, rather
than bypasses, the legislature, and thus is more consistent with the
Progressive than the Populist conception of government. In practice,
the indirect initiative has been disfavored in Washington 2 in part
50. See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(c). California initiatives sometimes contain provisions
allowing for subsequent amendment by the legislature (usually by a supermajority vote), but
such provisions are optional. A recent example is California Proposition 36 (2000), a measure
that promotes treatment rather than criminal penalties for drug offenders. Section 9 of that
initiative provided, "This act may be amended only by a roll call vote of two thirds of the
membership of both houses of the Legislature. All amendments to this act shall be to further the
act and shall be consistent with its purposes." CALIFORNIA OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION
GUIDE, 2000 CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION 69 (Nov. 7, 2000) available in <http://
www.VOTE2000.ss.ca.gov/VoterGuide/pdf/ballotpamphlet.pdf>.
51. The Washington Constitution, Article 11, section 1(a), provides the following pro-
cedure.
Initiative petitions shall be filed with the secretary of state not less than four months
before the election at which they are to be voted upon, or not less than ten days before
any regular session of the legislature. If filed at least four months before the election
at which they are to be voted upon, he shall submit the same to the vote of the people
at the said election. If such petitions are filed not less than ten days before any regular
session of the legislature, he shall certify the results within forty days of the filing. If
certification is not complete by the date that the legislature convenes, he shall provi-
sionally certify the measure pending final certification of the measure. Such initiative
measures, whether certified or provisionally certified, shall take precedence over all
other measures in the legislature except appropriation bills and shall be either enacted
or rejected without change or amendment by the legislature before the end of such
regular session. If any such initiative measures shall be enacted by the legislature it
shall be subject to the referendum petition, or it may be enacted and referred by the
legislature to the people for approval or rejection at the next regular election. If it is
rejected or if no action is taken upon it by the legislature before the end of such
regular session, the secretary of state shall submit it to the people for approval or
rejection at the next ensuing regular general election. The legislature may reject any
measure so proposed by initiative petition and propose a different one dealing with
the same subject, and in such event both measures shall be submitted by the secretary
of state to the people for approval or rejection at the next ensuing regular general
election. When conflicting measures are submitted to the people the ballots shall be
so printed that a voter can express separately by making one cross (X) for each, two
preferences, first, as between either measure and neither, and secondly, as between
one and the other. If the majority of those voting on the first issue is for neither, both
fail, but in that case the votes on the second issue shall nevertheless be carefully
counted and made public. If a majority voting on the first issue is for either, then the
measure receiving a majority of the votes on the second issue shall be law.
WASH. CONST. art II, § l(a).
52. In Washington between 1914 and 2000, 113 initiatives were submitted directly to the
people, but only twenty-seven to the legislature. Office of the Secretary of State, State of
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because few incentives favor the indirect initiative (e.g., the signature
requirements are the same as for direct initiatives),53 and also because
many initiative sponsors distrust the legislature and would rather take
their proposals directly to the people than bother with elected officials.
Nevertheless, providing the option of sending an initiative to the legis-
lature affirms the Progressives' vision of initiative lawmaking.
Taken together, these three Progressive-oriented procedural
characteristics have helped to make Washington's initiative process
less of a Populist free-for-all than it otherwise might be. But, within
these boundaries, there still is room for Populists to operate.
With respect to substance, Washington has a history of Progres-
sive-oriented initiatives, such as 1-207 (1960),' 4 which established the
state's civil service system, and 1-276 (1972), 55 a wide-ranging political
reform act that established open meeting requirements, lobbyist regu-
lations, and campaign finance rules. However, these Progressive-
oriented initiatives, designed to improve and "redeem" representative
government, increasingly have been overshadowed by Populist-
oriented measures such as those seeking to limit representatives'
terms 56 and to constrain their ability to make policy choices. 7  The
recent successes of Eyman, founder of Permanent Offense,5" and
Washington, Summary of Initiatives and Referenda: 1994-2000 (last modified Feb. 26, 2000)
< http://www.secstate.wa.gov/inits/initsum.htm>.
53. Proponents of both initiatives to the people and initiatives to the legislature must sub-
mit signatures equaling eight percent of the vote in the most recent gubernatorial election.
WASH. CONST. art. II, § l(a).
54. See State Civil Service Law, ch. 1, 1961 Wash. Laws 1 (encoding 1-207).
55. See Act effective Dec. 7, 1972, ch. 1, 1973 Wash. Laws 1 (encoding 1-276).
56. See Office of the Secretary of State, State of Washington, Initiatives to the People: 1914
Through 2000 (last modified Feb. 26, 2001) <http://www.secstate.wa.gov/inits/iphist.htm>
(citing 1-573, Shall Candidates for Certain Offices, Who Have Already Served for Specified
Time Periods in Those Offices, Be Denied Ballot Access? (1992)).
57. Many examples of initiatives seek to constrain legislative flexibility, including 1-601
(1993), establishing limits on state spending; 1-200 (1998), prohibiting state-sponsored affirma-
tive action; and 1-695 (1999) and 1-722 (2000), requiring voter approval for tax increases. See id.
Importantly, however, not all "legislative-constraining" initiatives are associated with the polit-
ical right. For example, an initiative like 1-732 (2000), which requires salary increases for public
school teachers, was supported by the political left, yet it undermines the legislature's authority
and flexibility on budget issues. For a discussion of the implications of using the initiative
process to constrain legislative choices, see Elizabeth G. Hill, Ballot Box Budgeting, EDSOURCE
PUBLICATIONS, Dec. 1990, at 1 (noting that approximately three-fourths of California's state
budget is not subject to legislative control through the budget process, and that more than half of
this restriction is due to initiatives).
58. Eyman calls his initiative organization Permanent Offense. See <http://www.
permanent-offense.org/>. Following judicial invalidation of 1-695 and 1-722, Eyman proposed a
new initiative, 1-747, "the Spirit of 695," which would limit property tax increases in Washing-
ton to one percent per year. Id.
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Bockwinkel, "queen of signature gatherers in Washington,"" suggest
that the Populist conception of initiative lawmaking is prevailing in
Washington as elsewhere.
More specifically, what is it about the process and substance of
Populist-oriented initiative lawmaking that makes initiatives vulner-
able to legal attack? Let us look at each in turn.
A. Process
In contrast to the often slow, careful, and compromise-oriented
nature of most legislative action, the Populist-oriented direct initiative
process is what V.0. Key, Jr. and Winston Crouch called a "battering
ram." 60  It is a heavy, blunt instrument that can break through the
inertia of a checks-and-balances system and produce major policy
breakthroughs in an expedited way. However, this expediency often
comes at a cost. In avoiding careful vetting (i.e., in bypassing the
processes of informed deliberation, refinement, compromise, and
consensus-building that exist in any passably functional legislature),6'
an initiative emerges from the process more vulnerable to court
challenges.
More specifically, the initiative process has two primary features
that make the end product (voter-approved initiatives) vulnerable to
attack: proponents have absolute control of the framing and drafting of
the measure; and measures are fixed and unamendable at an early
stage of the process. Unlike in the legislative process, where a bill's
language is drafted (or at least reviewed) by staff attorneys, there are
no formalized drafting procedures in the initiative process. As a
formal matter, when the proponent files the measure with the Wash-
59. Baiter & Dickey, supra note 40, at B5. In 1994, Bockwinkel said, "Government's not
doing the job ... so the vacuum's been taken up by people willing to stand up and speak out....
We're taking government into our own hands." Barbara A. Serrano, Citizens Are Taking Initia-
tive: Proposals Reflect Loss of Faith in Legislators, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 27, 1994, at Al.
60. V.0. KEY, JR. & WINSTON W. CROUCH, THE INITIATIVE AND THE REFERENDUM
IN CALIFORNIA 458 (1939). In this section, I focus on initiatives to the people rather than on
initiatives to the legislature, because the latter, at least in theory, receive some of the benefits of
legislative procedures. Initiatives to the people bypass the legislature altogether.
61. Supporters of initiative lawmaking argue that initiative critics too often compare the ini-
tiative system to an idealized vision of legislatures. In fact, legislatures are flawed institutions
where the quality of deliberation and refinement sometimes disappoints. See, e.g., Lynn A.
Baker, Direct Democracy and Discrimination: A Public Choice Perspective, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
707, 748-49 (1991); Richard Briffault, Distrust of Democracy, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1347, 1362 (1985)
(reviewing DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS
IN THE UNITED STATES (1984)). Even when the legislature's processes are working imperfectly,
they still promote democratic values like deliberation and compromise more than the initiative
process does. Cain & Miller, supra note 35, 43-48; Richard B. Collins & Dale Gesterle, Structur-
ing the Ballot Initiative: Procedures that Do and Don't Work, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 47, 76-78
(1995).
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ington Secretary of State, the Secretary submits a copy to the Code
Reviser for review.62 That official reviews the initiative "for matters of
form and style, and such matters of substantive import as may be
agreeable to the petitioner, and shall recommend to the petitioner such
revision or alteration of the measure as may be deemed necessary and
appropriate." However, the recommendations are purely advisory,
and have no binding effect. 64  The Secretary of State then refers the
initiative to the Attorney General. 6' Although he or she prepares a
title and summary,66 the Attorney General has no affirmative duty to
review the measure's legal validity or to require the proponent to
revise the measure if it is legally flawed. In fact, the Attorney General
may not refuse to prepare a title and summary based on a conclusion
that the measure, if enacted, would be unconstitutional. 67  After this
minimal review, proponents circulate the measure to gather sufficient
signatures to place it on the ballot.6" Once it goes out for signature, a
measure cannot be amended again, even by the proponents, even if it
becomes apparent that the measure contains a flaw that should be
corrected.69
These characteristics of the initiative process have negative
implications for deliberation and refinement. The closed process
limits input from interested parties and consideration of other,
perhaps more optimal, alternatives. In addition, the restriction on
amendment after circulation forecloses opportunities to address flaws
and refine the measure. As a result, the nature of initiative lawmaking
makes it more likely that the product will contain flaws that will
expose the measure to subsequent court challenge.
Moreover, by limiting the opportunities for opponents and other
interested parties to participate in the process, the initiative system
makes compromise and consensus-building less imperative to success.
In the initiative process, opponents have no leverage to force amend-
ments or compromise. If the proponents are confident that their
62. See WASH. REV. CODE § 29.79.015 (1998).
63. Id.
64. See Even, supra note 17, at 257-58.
65. See WASH. REV. CODE § 29.79.030 (1998).
66. See id.
67. See Philadelphia II v. Gregoire, 128 Wash. 2d 707, 714-15, 911 P.2d 389, 392-93
(1996).
68. In Washington, the required number of valid signatures of legal voters is equal to eight
percent of the votes cast for the office of governor at the last gubernatorial election preceding the
initial filing with the Secretary of State of the initiative measure text. See WASH. CONST. art. II,
§ 1(a).
69. See Even, supra note 17, at 256-67, for a detailed discussion of procedures for initiative
lawmaking in Washington.
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proposal can win the support of the initiative electorate, they can
ignore their opponents' interests and maximize their own. Unlike in
the legislature, initiative proponents have no need to build a larger
consensus in order to win approval of an initiative-a simple majority
of the electorate will do, even if the majority is relatively apathetic and
the minority intense. In allowing proponents to eschew compromise
and accommodation of competing interests, the initiative system
polarizes. Again, opponents have few options: if they cannot defeat
the measure outright at the polls, their only recourse is to litigate. In
fact, initiative opponents who lose at the polls very often challenge the
initiative in the courts.70
B. Substance
If the Populist-oriented, battering-ram process of initiative law-
making contributes to the large number of initiative challenges and
invalidations, so does the Populist substance of initiatives. Initiatives
in Washington (as elsewhere) often manifest a Populist impulse-
many seek to constrain or undermine representative government or
reinforce majority values at the expense of minority interests and
individual rights. Why does the Populist substance of initiatives fuel
litigation? Simply put, it is because the content of Populist-oriented
initiatives often conflicts with constitutional norms, and courts have
the responsibility to defend these norms against attack. Federal and
state constitutions (1) establish institutions of government and (2)
prohibit laws that unduly infringe on individual and minority rights.
By attacking the institutions of representative government or by
imposing majority values at the expense of minority rights, Populist-
oriented initiatives often run counter to these constitutional norms. It
is natural for this conflict to produce litigation.
1. Initiatives to Constrain Representative Government
A common initiative is one designed to control or constrain
representative government. Examples from Washington state include
voter-approved initiatives to limit state officials' salaries, 71 limit state
7127revenues, impose term limits on elected officials,73 limit state spend-
70. See supra notes 24-27, and accompanying text.
71. See Office of the Secretary of State, State of Washington, Initiatives to the People: 1914
Through 2000 (last modified Feb. 26, 2001) <http://www.secstate.wa.gov/inits/iphist.htm>
(citing 1-282, Shall State Elected Officials' Salary Increases Be Limited to 5.5% Over 1965
Levels, and Judges' the Same Over 1972 Levels? (1973)).
72. See id. (citing 1-62, Shall State Tax Revenues Be Limited So That Increases Do Not
Exceed the Growth Rate of Total State Personal Income? (1979)).
73. See id. (citing 1-573, Shall Candidates for Certain Offices, Who Have Already Served
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in 74g, and limit taxes and require voter approval for future tax
increases.75 It is understandable that these proposals have been
pursued through the initiative process, because representatives have a
vested interest in maintaining their institutional powers. The normal
inertia built into the checks and balances system is magnified when it
comes to measures that adversely affect legislators, and it is extremely
rare for legislatures to adopt such reforms.
The most striking example of this dynamic is term limits. Over
the past decade, polls have shown that a majority of Americans favor
term limits for elected officials. 6 When members of Congress and
state legislatures refused to approve proposals to impose term limits
on themselves, voters invoked the initiative process. 77 However, term
limit measures and other attempts to use initiatives to constrain or
control representative government often conflict with constitutional
provisions that establish these institutions. In Washington, for
example, 1-573, the 1992 voter-approved term limits initiative, came
into conflict with state constitutional provisions establishing qualifica-
tions for state elected officials. The Washington Supreme Court held
that imposition of term limits could only be effected through a consti-
tutional amendment. 78  Similarly, the United States Supreme Court
held that efforts by states (including Washington) to impose term
limits on members of Congress violated the United States Constitu-
tion's provisions establishing qualifications for election to Congress.79
for Specified Time Periods in Those Offices, Be Denied Ballot Access? (1992)).
74. See id. (citing 1-601, Shall State Expenditures Be Limited by Inflation Rates and
Population Growth, and Taxes Exceeding the Limit Be Subject to Referendum? (1993)).
75. See id. (citing 1-695, Shall Voter Approval Be Required for Any Tax Increase, License
Tab Fees Be $30 Per Year for Motor Vehicles, and Existing Vehicle Taxes Be Repealed? (1999);
1-722, Shall Certain 1999 Tax and Fee Increases Be Nullified, Vehicles Exempted from Property
Taxes, and Property Tax Increases (Except New Construction) Limited to 2% Annually?
(2000)).
76. For example, an April 1996 Gallup Poll showed that 74% of Americans favored
congressional term limits. At the time, Paul Jacob, executive director of U.S. Term Limits, Inc.,
said, "I thought we had reached a peak in 1992, but I was wrong." Bill Varner, Voters in 14
States to Decide on Limiting Congressional Terms, USA TODAY, Oct. 17, 1996, at 4A.
77. Nationwide, with the exception of North Dakota, Illinois and Mississippi, every state
where citizens have the opportunity to place initiatives on the ballot (i.e., in twenty-one of the
twenty-four states with the initiative process), term limits have been adopted. By contrast, with
the exception of Louisiana, none of the twenty-six states that lack provisions for initiative law-
making have adopted term limits through the legislative process. The New Hampshire legisla-
ture attempted to impose term limits on the state's representatives in Congress, but not on itself.
Similarly, despite strong pressure for congressional term limits, members of Congress have
declined to adopt proposals to limit their own terms. Telephone Interview with Paul Jacob,
National Director, U.S. Term Limits, Inc. (Feb. 25, 2000).
78. See Gerberding v. Munro, 134 Wash. 2d 188, 210, 949 P.2d 1366, 1377 (1998).
79. See U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 837-38 (1995).
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The Court did not allow states to undermine those provisions on a
piecemeal basis-only the arduous process of amending the federal
Constitution would do. 80 In short, the job of defining how far an
initiative can go in altering representative institutions falls to the
courts, and the work of resolving these conflicts significantly fuels the
high rate of initiative challenges.
2. Initiatives Affecting Racial and Other Minorities
In recent decades, at both the federal and state level, representa-
tive government has made numerous efforts to improve conditions for
historically disadvantaged groups, including racial minorities, women,
immigrants, language minorities, and homosexuals. These efforts
have promoted voting rights for various minority groups, racial deseg-
regation of the public schools, bilingual education programs, affirma-
tive action programs to benefit racial minorities and women, and legal
protections for persons who face discrimination on the basis of their
race, gender, national origin, or sexual orientation.
At times, government efforts to assist minorities have stirred
resentment, which in turn has fueled counter-efforts to reestablish and
reinforce majoritarian interests. At the state level, the initiative
process has provided a convenient vehicle for repealing or preempting
representative government's efforts to assist minorities. In some
states, such as California and Colorado, voters have approved a steady
stream of such initiatives in recent decades, nearly all of which have
been challenged in court.8 ' Washington voters have largely refrained
from such measures, but two examples are 1-350 (1978), which sought
to prohibit school districts from using mandatory busing to deseg-
regate public schools,82 and 1-200 (1998), which dismantled the state's
80. Id.
81. Challenged initiatives in California include Proposition 14 (1964), prohibiting enact-
ment of fair housing laws, which the Supreme Court invalidated in Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S.
369 (1967). Proposition 21 (1972), prohibiting racial assignments to desegregate public schools,
was invalidated in part in Santa Barbara School Dist. v. Superior Court, 530 P.2d 605 (Cal. 1975).
All but three sections of Proposition 187 (1994), restricting services to undocumented immi-
grants, were invalidated. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp.
755 (C.D. Cal. 1995); League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, 997 F. Supp. 1244
(C.D. Cal. 1997). Proposition 209 (1996), prohibiting affirmative action in state contracting,
hiring, and university admissions, was challenged but upheld in Californians for Economic Equity
v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997). Colorado examples include the following: Amendment
8 (1974), prohibiting racial assignments to desegregate public schools, challenged but not
invalidated in Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 119 F.3d 1437 (10th Cir. 1997); Amendment 1 (1988),
establishing English as the state's official language, challenged but upheld in Montero v. Meyer,
13 F.3d 1444 (10th Cir. 1994); and Amendment 2 (1992), prohibiting enactment of antidiscrim-
ination laws for sexual orientation, invalidated in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
82. Office of the Secretary of State, State of Washington, Initiatives to the People: 1914-
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system of affirmative action for racial minorities and women.8 3 1-350
was challenged for conflicting with the 14th Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause, and was invalidated in Washington v. Seattle School
District No. 1.84 1-200 has not yet been challenged, perhaps in part
because a similar initiative, California's Proposition 209, was upheld
by the Ninth Circuit in 1997."s
These types of initiatives present hard legal questions: How far
can the electorate go in restricting representative government's efforts
to protect minority interests? At what point do these majoritarian
counter-measures infringe on minority rights? In the American
system, courts have long assumed responsibility for protecting racial
and certain other "discrete and insular" minorities, especially when
prejudice against them "tends seriously to curtail the operation of
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minor-
ities." '86 When an initiative affects a minority thus protected, it is
predictable that after the election the measure's opponents will
petition the courts to strike it down. This conflict between the
initiative system's tendency to produce measures directed at protected
minorities, and the courts' commitment to strictly scrutinize such
measures, naturally generates litigation.
3. Criminal Justice Initiatives
Those accused and convicted of crimes, especially violent crimes,
are a highly unpopular minority group. In recent decades, large seg-
ments of the public have viewed legislatures and courts as being too
soft on criminals. Thus, conditions have been ripe for initiatives that
restrict the rights of the accused and increase the penalties for those
convicted. When "tough-on-crime" measures appear on the ballot,
they almost always win, and often by large margins.87
2000 (last modified Feb. 26, 2001) <http://www.secstate.wa.gov/inits/iphist.htm> (citing I-
350, Shall Public Educational Authorities Be Prohibited from Assigning Students to Other Than
the Nearest or Next-Nearest School with Limited Exceptions? (1978)). 1-350 was a response to
the "Seattle Plan" in which Seattle schools attempted to achieve racial balance by imposing racial
busing. The initiative sought to prohibit school districts from "requir[ing] any student to attend
a school other than the school which is geographically nearest or next nearest the student's place
of residence." Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 462 (quoting 1-350). It
received 66% of the vote. Id.
83. See id. (citing 1-200, Shall Government Be Prohibited from Discriminating or Granting
Preferential Treatment Based on Race, Sex, Color, Ethnicity or National Origin in Public
Employment, Education, and Contracting (1998)).
84. 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
85. See Californians for Economic Equity, 122 F.3d at 692.
86. U.S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
87. In the history of the California initiative, for example, six "tough-on-crime" initiatives
have appeared on the ballot, and voters have approved all of them. These include Proposition 17
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Washington voters have approved fewer of these measures than
have voters in some other high-use initiative states, but two examples
are 1-316,"8 which sought to require a mandatory death penalty for
first degree murder, and 1-593,89 which required life sentences for
certain repeat offenders. Federal and state constitutions, however,
expressly protect the rights of the criminally accused and prohibit the
imposition of "cruel and unusual" punishment, and courts have taken
seriously their responsibility to protect these rights. The clash
between the public's impulse to crack down on crime and the courts'
role in ensuring that criminal justice procedures protect the rights of
the accused is another way in which the Populist subject matter of
initiatives contributes to the high rate of initiative litigation. In fact,
both of Washington's voter-approved "tough on crime" initiatives
were challenged on federal constitutional grounds.9" The Washington
Supreme Court invalidated the mandatory death penalty initiative, 91
but upheld "three-strikes-and-you're-out."92
Overall, in Washington, as in other high-use initiative states, the
Populist-oriented process of initiative lawmaking, with its limitations
on deliberation, refinement, compromise, and consensus-building, and
the Populist-oriented substance of many initiatives, which pushes
constitutional limits in their restrictions on representative government
and individual and minority rights, expose initiatives to legal chal-
lenge. These two factors go a long way toward explaining why so
(1972) (authorizing the death penalty); Proposition 7 (1978) (again authorizing the death
penalty); Proposition 8 (1982) (enacting stricter rules for criminal sentencing); Proposition 115
(1990) (increasing criminal penalties and restricting defendants' rights); Proposition 184 (1994)
(imposing "three strikes" criminal sentencing for repeat offenders); and Proposition 21 (2000)
(establishing stricter criminal procedures and penalties for certain juvenile offenders). California
Secretary of State Bill Jones, A History of the California Initiative Process, Dec. 1996, at 16-71
(updated through the 2000 election), available in
<http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/elections-j.htm>. See also Miller, supra note 12, at 24.
88. Office of the Secretary of State, State of Washington, Initiatives to the People: 1914-
2000 (last modified Feb. 26, 2001) <http://www.secstate.wa.gov/inits/iphist.htm> (citing I-
316, Shall the Death Penalty Be Mandatory in the Case of Aggravated Murder in the First
Degree? (1975)).
89. Id. (citing 1-593, Shall Criminals Who Are Convicted of "Most Serious Offenses" on
Three Occasions Be Sentenced to Life in Prison Without Parole? (1993)).
90. See State v. Manussier, 129 Wash. 2d 652, 921 P.2d 482 (1996) (challenge to 1-593
(1993), the "three strikes law"); State v. Green, 91 Wash. 2d 431, 588 P.2d 1370 (1979) (chal-
lenge to 1-316 (1975), requiring mandatory death penalty for aggravated murder).
91. See Green, 91 Wash. 2d at 446, 558 P.2d at 1379 (finding that the statute qualified by
1-316, requiring mandatory death penalty for aggravated murder, violated the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments).
92. See Manussier, 129 Wash. 2d at 672-84, 921 P.2d at 482-88 (finding that 1-593, the
"three strikes law," did not violate the Fifth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendments).
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many initiatives are challenged in court and why so many initiatives
are invalidated.
IV. COURTS' ATTITUDE TOWARD INITIATIVES: JURIS-POPULISTS
V. INITIATIVE WATCHDOGS
Through the initiative process, Populists have found an effective
way to bypass legislatures and enact laws directly. They have not,
however, found a way to bypass the courts.93 By virtue of their power
of judicial review, courts are the institutional filter through which all
laws potentially must pass.94 As we have seen, for a number of rea-
sons, initiatives frequently end up being tested in court. When this
occurs, the court's attitude toward initiative lawmaking becomes
crucial. How do judges view initiatives? Are judges tough on initia-
tives, or do they give them the benefit of the doubt?
In addressing this question, one must begin by noting that courts
have refused to question the constitutional validity of the initiative
process itself. Early critics of initiative lawmaking argued that the
process is per se incompatible with Madisonian principles of republi-
can government and violates Article IV, Section 4 of the United States
Constitution, which states, "The United States shall guarantee to
every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government.
' 95
Courts were unwilling to embrace this argument and thereby pull the
93. State constitutions in two states, Colorado (COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 1 (1914)) and
Nevada (NEV. CONST. art. XIX, § 2 (1904)), were amended to prohibit judicial invalidation of
initiatives. However, the Colorado provision is no longer in force and the present Nevada
provision (NEV. CONST. art. XIX, § 1, ci. 2) is unlikely to bar judicial review. See Eule, supra
note 11, at 1546 n.184.
94. Since its inception, judicial review has sparked controversy regarding its proper role in
the American political system. See, e.g.,; ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-23 (1962); ROBERT H. BORK,
THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 15-18 (1990); JESSE
H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL
RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 4 (1980); James B. Thayer, The
Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893).
Most analysis of judicial review focuses on its operation within the context of representative
government. Thus, what Bickel calls "the counter-majoritarian difficulty" is generally under-
stood as the nullification by unelected judges of laws enacted by elected representatives. Judicial
review of direct democracy, however, is a more acute counter-majoritarian act. When a court
strikes down a voter-approved initiative, it is not checking a coordinate branch of representative
government; it is checking the people themselves. As one former California Supreme Court
Justice noted, "It is one thing for a court to tell a legislature that a statute it has adopted is
unconstitutional; to tell that to the people of a state who have indicated their direct support for
the measure through the ballot is another." JOSEPH GRODIN, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE:
REFLECTIONS OF A STATE SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 105 (1989). Overturning a direct vote of
the people thus has its own dynamic, different from judicial review of "ordinary" legislation. See
Eule, supra note 11, at 1504-08; Cain & Miller, supra note 35, at 54-57.
95. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4, cl. 1.
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plug on direct democracy. In 1912, the United States Supreme Court
held in Pacific States Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Oregon that the
question of whether the initiative process violates the Constitution's
guarantee of a republican form of government is a nonjusticiable
political question." Two years before that, the Washington Supreme
Court also rejected a Guarantee Clause challenge to initiative lawmak-
ing in Hartig v. City of Seattle.97
In recent years, some parties seeking to invalidate initiatives
(including 1-593 of 1993, Washington's "Three Strikes" law) have
included Guarantee Clause challenges in their petitions. In State v.
Manussier,9s the Washington Supreme Court rejected the Guarantee
Clause claim, noting that "Pacific still represents good law, and earlier
cases decided by this court have been in accord with its holding. 9
Although some other state courts have recently expressed interest in
the Guarantee Clause's relationship to initiative lawmaking, none has
yet invalidated an initiative for violating the guarantee of republican
government."' 0 Jeffrey T. Even, a Washington Assistant Attorney
96. 223 U.S. 118,150-51 (1912).
97. 53 Wash. 432, 102 P. 408 (1909). See also Kadderly v. City of Portland, 74 P. 710,
719-20 (Or. 1903) (upholding the Oregon initiative system against Guarantee Clause challenge
in part because the system allowed the legislature to amend voter-approved initiatives). Some
commentators, most notably law professor and former Oregon Supreme Court Justice Hans A.
Linde, hold a more nuanced view of the relationship between the Guarantee Clause and direct
democracy. Linde argues that while initiative lawmaking is not inherently nonrepublican, cer-
tain types of initiatives are inconsistent with republican government, and courts, including state
courts, can and should invoke the Guarantee Clause to invalidate them. Linde is concerned in
part with initiatives that violate republican principles by structurally eliminating the lawmaking
authority of elected representatives. See David B. Frohnmayer & Hans A. Linde, Initiating
"Laws" as "Constitutional Amendments": An Amicus Brief, 34 WILLAMETTEL. REV. 749 (1998).
Because Washington does not allow initiative constitutional amendments and permits legislative
amendment of initiative statutes, it largely avoids this problem. Linde's other principal concern
is when initiatives are motivated by "passion" or "interest" (in the sense that Madison used those
terms), enacted by a pure majoritarian process rather than through the filters of republican
government. See Hans A. Linde, Who Is Responsible for Republican Government? 65 U. COLO.
L. REV. 709, 712 (1994); Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking Is Not "Republican Govern-
ment": The Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REV. 19, 34-35 (1993); Hans A. Linde,
When Is Initiative Lawmaking Not "Republican Government"? 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 159,
166-69 (1989). For critiques of this approach, see, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, Observations on the
Guarantee Clause As Thoughtfully Addressed by Justice Linde and Professor Eule, 65 U. COLO. L.
REV. 741 (1994) and Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular
Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 749 (1994).
98. 129 Wash. 2d 652, 921 P.2d 473 (1996).
99. Id. at 671, 921 P.2d 482 (citations omitted).
100. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Colorado, 951 P.2d 911, 916 (Colo. 1998) (invalidating an ini-
tiative on other grounds and declining to reach Guarantee Clause issue). While noting that the
challenged initiative (which would have placed a "scarlet letter" on the ballot next to the names
of candidates who failed to endorse a federal term limits amendment) was "inconsistent with
Article IV, Section 4 (the Guarantee Clause)," the court did not reach the question of whethet
Article IV, Section 4 is justiciable. Id.
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General, recently surmised, "At this juncture in constitutional history,
it would be astonishing if the courts were suddenly to announce that
the Guarantee Clause prohibited or severely restricted the ability of
the people to exercise a legislative function they have utilized for
nearly a century."101
A second issue for courts is whether to apply a different level of
scrutiny to individual initiatives than they do to "ordinary legislation."
The United States Supreme Court has held that courts should apply
the same standard of review to initiatives as to laws enacted by repre-
sentative government."'
While initiative lawmaking has increased in recent decades, a
growing number of judges and legal scholars have questioned this"equal treatment" principle. The debate can be summarized as fol-
lows. One view, which I call the "juris-populist" position, maintains
that courts should accommodate initiative lawmaking and should give
greater deference to initiatives than to ordinary legislation. The
rationale for this view is that initiatives represent the "pure" will of the
people, and popular sovereignty is entitled to great respect. One pro-
ponent of this view was United States Supreme Court Justice Hugo
Black. Justice Black asserted that the initiative process is "as near to a
democracy as you can get" and that a legal challenge to a law should
have less force if the law was enacted by the people directly than if it
were enacted by the legislature. 3 Black extolled direct democracy in
three high-profile cases: Reitman v. Mulkey,"'4 Hunter v. Erickson,'
and James v. Valtierra. °6 More recently, on the Ninth Circuit Court
101. Even, supra note 17, at 256. For another practitioner's view, see Hardy Myers, The
Guarantee Clause and Direct Democracy, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 659, 662 (1998) (noting that"the relationship between the Guarantee Clause and the initiative process ... may be the greatest
undefined relationship between the U.S. Constitution and state lawmaking.").
102. See Citizens for Rent Control Coalition for Fair Housing v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S.
290, 295 (1981). In reviewing a local initiative, the Court declared, "It is irrelevant that the
voters rather than the legislative body enacted [the challenged law]." Id. Generally, a law,
whether enacted by representative government or by the people directly, is merely required to
satisfy a rationality test; that is, it must be rationally related to a legitimate state interest. The
law faces heightened scrutiny only if it creates a suspect classification, usually involving race, or
infringes on a fundamental right protected by the Constitution, such as freedom of speech. See
generally LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 769 (2d Ed. 1988).
103. See Oral Argument, Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967), in 64 LANDMARK
BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 668 (Phillip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975); Eule, supra note 11, at
1506.
104. 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (invalidating California Proposition 14 (1964), which repealed
California's fair housing act and prohibited enactment of similar legislation).
105. 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (invalidating an Akron, Ohio charter amendment requiring voter
approval of fair housing legislation).
106. 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (upholding Article XXXIX of the California Constitution, which
requires prior voter approval before a public body can develop a federally-financed, low-income
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of Appeals, Justice Diarmuid O'Scannlain seemed to give special
deference to a state constitutional provision because it was approved
directly by voters. In an opinion reversing the district court's invali-
dation of California's Proposition 209, Justice O'Scannlain wrote, "A
system which permits one judge to block with the stroke of a pen what
4,736,180 state residents voted to enact as law tests the integrity of our
constitutional democracy. '"107
Of the current justices on the Washington Supreme Court, Jus-
tice Richard Sanders most clearly presents himself as a juris-populist.
He submitted sharply-worded dissents in two recent cases invalidating
the state's Populist-oriented term limits initiative 08 and 1-695.109 In
his dissent in the term limits case, Sanders defended the initiative,
claiming,
Term limits, which ensure our legislators remain citizen legisla-
tors, not career state employees, are generally consistent with
[the state's] constitutional framework and specifically consistent
with our citizens' historically Populist mistrust of the legislature.
That this legacy remains in the minds of our citizens perhaps
explains the popular adoption of the act before us today.1"'
As noted above, Justice Sanders made it a point to mention in his
Gerberding dissent that "[tloday, six votes on this court are the
undoing of 1,119,985 votes that Washingtonians cast at the polls in
favor of term limits." 1 ' When a judge cites those kinds of figures, it is
likely that he or she is a juris-populist, and Justice Sanders clearly
belongs to the category of judges seeking to give deference to Populist-
oriented initiative lawmaking.
The competing view, which I call the "initiative watchdog"
perspective, maintains that the initiative process is seriously deficient
compared to representative government, and that courts should give
less deference to initiatives than to "ordinary" legislation. The
housing project).
107. Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 699 (9th Cir. 1992). Califor-
nia's Proposition 209, Prohibition Against Discrimination or Preferential Treatment by State and
Other Public Entities (1996), dismantled the state's affirmative action programs for state con-
tracting, hiring, and university admissions. The "Yes" vote for Proposition 209 was 5,268,462;
the No vote was 4,388,733. California Secretary of State Bill Jones, Statement of Vote: November
5, 1996, at xiii. See California Secretary of State Bill Jones, 2001 Initiative Update (visited June 1,
2001) <http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/elections-j.htm>.
108. See Gerberding v. Munro, 134 Wash. 2d 188, 211, 949 P.2d 1366, 1378 (1998)
(Sanders, J., dissenting).
109. See Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587 v. State, 142 Wash. 2d 183, 258, 11 P.3d
762, 806 (2000) (Sanders, J., dissenting).
110. Gerberding, 134 Wash. 2d at 229, 949 P.2d at 1386.
111. Id. at 230, 949 P.2d at 1388.
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rationale for this view is that judicial review is designed to act as a
filter to protect constitutional principles and minority rights against
majoritarian attack, and thus, courts need to be more vigilant, not less,
when reviewing laws enacted through the initiative's unfiltered major-
itarian process. In recent years, several legal commentators, including
Derrick Bell'12 and the late Julian Eule,"l have advanced this view.
This approach faces two challenges: determining which kinds of
initiatives warrant increased scrutiny, and, for those that do, deciding
how strict the scrutiny should be.
With respect to the first problem, Eule argued that certain initia-
tives (e.g., those that impact individual rights and equal application of
the laws, as well as those that restructure government or limit taxes or
expenditures) should receive heightened judicial scrutiny, whereas
other initiatives (e.g., those that improve the processes of representa-
tive government, including measures that impose ethical rules on
public officials, regulate lobbyists, or restrict campaign contributions)
should not."' (In my terms, he would have had courts apply
heightened scrutiny to Populist-oriented initiatives, and ordinary
review to Progressive-oriented ones.)
The second problem facing this approach is how to define a
heightened level of scrutiny for initiatives. Eule suggested,
I do not perceive the concept of a hard judicial look to be a rigid
one. Unlike "strict scrutiny"-a standard which on paper at
least can be reduced to precise formulation-it is not intended to
take on a unitary form. What I have in mind is more a general
notion that courts should be willing to examine the realities of
substantive plebiscites-that the unspoken assumptions about
the legislative process that so often induce judicial restraint
deserve less play in a setting where they are more fanciful.
Sometimes a hard judicial look will take the form-[as it did in
the Seattle busing case]--of a candid "We know what's going on
here and we won't allow any of it." In other situations...
recognition that the burden of plebiscitary action falls on polit-
112. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum: Democracy's Barrier to Racial Equality, 54
WASH. L. REV. 1 (1978).
113. See Eule, supra note 11.
114. Id. at 1559-60. Eule argued that in addition to applying strict scrutiny to measures
that create suspect classifications or infringe on fundamental rights, courts should apply height-
ened scrutiny to any initiative that could have the effect of disadvantaging minorities. Initiatives
that alter government structure or reapportion legislative districts, he argued, are often a fagade
for disenfranchising minorities. Id. at 1560 & n.255. Taxation and spending limitations, he
argued, principally benefit upper- and upper-middle class white citizens, while burdening under-
represented racial minorities and the poor. Id. Because the initiative process does not adequately
protect the interests of these groups, he argued, courts should aggressively review initiatives that
disadvantage them. Id. at 1560.
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ical actors able to defend their interests in the popular arena,
combined with the need to conserve limited judicial capital, will
appropriately lead to a more modest form of review.115
More recently, a commentator boldly suggested that all chal-
lenged initiatives be subjected to strict scrutiny. '16 If this standard
were universally applied, however, the effect on the initiative process
would be lethal.1 7 But, perhaps that is precisely the unspoken
objective. For those who are convinced that initiative lawmaking is
dangerous, using judicial review to strangle the process would indeed
be a good thing.
Although they do not expressly say so, some judges seem to
apply a higher level of scrutiny to initiatives.1 8 Two examples are
judges Stephen Reinhardt and Betty B. Fletcher of the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals. In Jones v. Bates, 19 judges Reinhardt and Fletcher
held that a term limit initiative1 20 was unconstitutional essentially
because when voting on the initiative, voters were ignorant or con-
fused about whether or not the initiative imposed a lifetime ban.Y12 If"voter ignorance" were the controlling standard, however, most initia-
tives would be suspect.12 2  Nevertheless, the two Ninth Circuit
initiative watchdogs concluded that part of the process of enacting the
initiative (i.e., informing voters of the initiative's impact) was so
inadequate that the enactment was invalid. 23 In a subsequent en banc
115. Id. at 1572-73 (citations omitted).
116. See Mihui Pak, The Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty in Focus: Judicial Review of
Initiatives, 32 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 237, 265 (1999).
117. Justice Thurgood Marshall suggested that strict scrutiny is "strict in theory, but fatal
in fact." Fullilove v. Klutznik, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring), overruled by
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (holding that because federal racial
classifications must serve a compelling governmental interest and be narrowly tailored to further
that interest, to the extent that Fullilove held federal racial classifications subject to a less rigorous
standard, it is no longer controlling). Justice Sandra Day O'Connor disagrees with Justice Mar-
shall, pointing out that all Justices of the Court agreed that the discriminatory conduct of a state
department justified a narrowly tailored race-based remedy. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237 (citing
United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 167 (1987)).
118. Pak, supra note 116, at 251.
119. 127 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. 1997), rev'd en banc sub nom., Bates v. Jones, 131 F.3d 843 (9th
Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1021 (1998).
120. See Jones, 127 F.3d at 843 (California Proposition 140 was adopted by voters in
1990.).
121. Id. at 863.
122. See Bates, 131 F.3d at 853 (O'Scannlain, J., concurring) ("Searching the Constitu-
tion ... I am unable to locate an 'ignorant voter clause' that vests federal courts with the power
to review voter-enacted legislation to ensure that enough people were capable of understanding
what they voted for at the ballot.").
123. See Jones, 127 F.3d at 858-63.
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ruling, however, the Ninth Circuit rejected this watchdog view and
upheld California's term limits amendment.12
4
Judges Reinhardt and Fletcher seem to have staked out an
extreme initiative watchdog position. I will argue, however, that they
may be trendsetters, because supreme courts in several initiative
states-including Washington-seem to be gravitating in their
direction.
V. CONSTRAINING POPULIST-ORIENTED INITIATIVE
LAWMAKING THROUGH THE SINGLE-SUBJECT RULE
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that in Washington and
elsewhere (1) courts are unlikely to prohibit or severely restrict initia-
tive lawmaking as violative of the Guarantee Clause; and (2) judges
officially apply the same standards of review to the substance of
initiatives as they do to the substance of ordinary legislation; but that
(3) judges vary in their attitudes about Populist-oriented initiative
lawmaking, and the degree of deference it deserves. In this section, I
will continue to focus on that last point, and I will offer evidence for
the argument that in several state courts, judicial attitudes toward
initiative lawmaking are discernibly shifting toward what I call the"watchdog" position. Specifically, this shift is evidenced by stricter
judicial enforcement of state constitutional limitations on initiative
lawmaking, especially so-called "single-subject rules." I contend that
the recent 1-695 case signals that the Washington Supreme Court is
moving in the watchdog direction as well.
The Washington Constitution, like constitutions in other initia-
tive states, includes several limitations on initiative lawmaking. 2 ' One
of those limitations is that an initiative must contain only one sub-
ject."' It is actually more accurate to say that Washington's single-
subject rule applies by implication to initiatives. The Washington
Supreme Court (like courts in Idaho, Illinois, Montana, Nevada, and
Oklahoma) has determined that the state constitution's single-subject
restriction on "bills" applies not only to acts of the legislature, but to
initiatives as well. 127
124. See Bates, 131 F.3d at 843.
125. Examples include the single-subject rule and subject-in- title rule of Article II, section
19: "No bill shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title."
WASH. CONST. art. II, § 19. See also WASH. CONST. art. II, § 37 (an act revised or amended
must set forth at full length and may not be amended or revised by mere reference to its title);
Gerberding v. Munro, 134 Wash. 2d 188, 211, & n.11, 949 P.2d 1366, 1377, & n.ll (1998) (ini-
tiatives address only legislative matters and not amendments to the constitution).
126. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 19.
127. It has been argued that Washington's single-subject rule should not apply to initia-
tives, but only to legislative bills. See, e.g., Amalgamated Transit Union Local v. State, 142
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The generally stated purposes for imposing a single subject
requirement for legislation are to prevent "log-rolling" and to prevent
confusion. 12  Courts in several states have discovered, however, that
single subject rules potentially play another, larger role-that is, if
they are strictly enforced, they can be a powerful constraint on initia-
tive lawmaking. Professor Daniel H. Lowenstein notes that single-
subject rules allow for a wide range of interpretation because the
concept of subject is "infinitely malleable.' '129 Lowenstein observes,
If we examine only the words of the single-subject rule, two
extreme interpretations are possible. On the one hand, we might
plausibly conclude that no initiative could possibly violate the
rule. Consider the most bizarre assortment of unrelated provi-
sions you can imagine. The mere fact that the provisions have
been put together in one measure makes them constitute a"single subject," if only for purposes of discussion and study.
On the other hand, the language of the single-subject rule also
permits an interpretation that would abolish the initiative proc-
Wash. 2d 183, 261, 11 P.3d 762, 808 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
I would therefore posit a consistent reading of these provisions, giving effect to the
plain meaning of each word, may characterize initiatives to the legislature "bills," as
all other bills in the legislative process (except with priority); whereas initiatives
directly to the people at a general election are not "bills" but "laws," laws which are
necessarily outside the scope of Article II section 19, because they are not "bills."
Id. However, the court in Amalgamated Transit rejected this view and held that the single-sub-
ject rule applies to initiatives. Id. at 261, 11 P.3d at 780. See also Anne G. Campbell, In the Eye
of the Beholder: The Single Subject Rule for Ballot Initiatives, in THE BATTLE OVER CITIZEN
LAWMAKING: THE GROWING REGULATION OF INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM 131 (M.
Dane Waters ed., 2001).
128. The Washington Supreme Court defined "logrolling" as "pushing legislation through
by attaching it to other legislation." Amalgamated Transit, 142 Wash. 2d at 207, 11 P.3d at 781
(citing Power, Inc. v. Huntley, 39 Wash. 2d. 191, 198, 235 P.2d 173 (1951)). See also State v.
Waggoner, 80 Wash. 2d 7, 9, 490 P.2d 1308, 1309 (stating that the "prevention of logrolling is
one of the purposes of art. 2, s 19, of our constitution").
The requirement that all legislative proposals include no more than one subject is
consistent with basic democratic principles. The requirement is designed to present
clear legislative proposals to the legislature or the public and forestall the combining
of issues so that ones with minimal public support are not adopted merely because
they are attached to popular proposals.
Washington Federation of State Employees v. State, 127 Wash. 2d 544, 552, 910 P.2d 1028,
1032 (citing Fritz v. Gorton, 83 Wash. 2d 275, 335, 517 P.2d 911 (1974) (Rosellini, J., dissent-
ing)). But see Daniel H. Lowenstein, California Initiatives and the Single Subject Rule, 30 UCLA
L. REV. 936 (1983) (criticizing these justifications for the single subject rule).
[N]either of the commonly mentioned purposes of the single-subject rule-avoidance
of complexity and prevention of logrolling-is particularly well served by the rule.
This conclusion does not necessarily mean the framers of the rule did an inept job of
selecting means to accomplish their ends. It may mean that the purposes of the rule
have been misconceived.
Id. at 963.
129. Lowenstein, supra note 128, at 967.
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ess altogether. That is, it is impossible to conceive of a measure
that could not be broken down into parts, which could in turn be
regarded as separate subjects.1 30
This malleability provides courts the opportunity to either
accommodate or restrict initiative lawmaking. If courts interpret
single-subject rules generously, sponsors can merge together in one
initiative a wide array of proposals, thereby magnifying the measure's
impact. By contrast, a strict interpretation of the single-subject rule
limits an initiative sponsor's freedom of action and the initiative's
potential power.
State courts have taken various approaches to enforcing the
single-subject rule, with California and Florida staking out opposite
ends of the spectrum. California adopted a single-subject rule for
initiatives in 1948,' but the California Supreme Court applied a
liberal standard for enforcing it, requiring only that the various
elements of an initiative be "reasonably germane" and rejecting the
stricter standard that they be "functionally related."' At least until
130. Id. at 942.
131. California's single-subject rule for initiatives is now contained in California Constitu-
tion, Article II, section 8(d). The rule was enacted in 1948 as Article IV, section 1(c), and was
twice renumbered and rewritten. See Lowenstein, supra note 128, at 949-53 & n.69.
132. In 1949, the year after California adopted a single-subject rule for initiatives, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court held that the rule would be interpreted identically to the existing single-
subject rule for legislative acts. Under this interpretation, the single-subject rule was to be "con-
strued liberally to uphold proper legislation, all parts of which are reasonably germane." Perry v.
Jordan, 207 P.2d 47, 50 (Cal. 1949) (quoting Evans v. Superior Court, 8 P.2d 467 (Cal. 1932)).
Three decades later, California Supreme Court Justice Wiley Manuel advocated a stricter con-
struction of the rule, arguing it should require that all provisions of an initiative be "functionally
related in furtherance of a common underlying purpose." Schmitz v. Younger, 577 P.2d 652,
656 (Cal. 1978) (Manuel, J., dissenting). However, in that case, which occurred before the
election, the court refused to rule on the single-subject issue and declined to embrace Justice
Wiley's proposed test. See id. at 653. Shortly thereafter, in Fair Political Practices Comm'n v.
Superior Court, 599 P.2d 46, 47-51 (Cal. 1979), the court elaborated on its liberal interpretation
of the single-subject rule. In that case, the court upheld Proposition 9 of 1974, a complex
political reform initiative, against single-subject attack. The initiative was invalidated in part on
other grounds. See id. at 55. Noting that it is the duty of the courts to "jealously guard" the
people's right of initiative, the court reasoned that
voters may not be limited to brief general statements but may deal comprehensively
and in detail with an area of law.
Although the initiative measure before us is wordy and complex, there is little reason
to expect that claimed voter confusion could be eliminated or substantially reduced by
dividing the measure into four or ten separate propositions. Our society being
complex, the rules governing the initiative will necessarily be complex. Unless we are
to repudiate or cripple use of the initiative, risk of confusion must be borne.
Id. at 50. In Brosnahan v. Brown, 651 P.2d 274 (Cal. 1982), the court (by a 4-3 margin) upheld a
multipart criminal justice initiative against single subject attack and rejected the "functional
relationship" test. Three judges dissented and Chief Justice Bird charged that the majority had
"obliterate[d] one section of the state Constitution by effectively repealing the single subject
rule." Id. at 306 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
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last year, the California Supreme Court consistently upheld initiatives
against single-subject challenges.'33
The Florida Constitution contains a similar single-subject
requirement for initiatives, 134 but the Florida Supreme Court has
enforced it much more strictly. In Florida, initiatives are permitted
only for constitutional amendments, not for statutory matters. 135
Partly for that reason, the Florida Supreme Court has held that
initiatives require "strict compliance" with the single-subject rule
because "our constitution is the basic document that controls our gov-
ernmental functions, "136 and thus it should not be easily amended. In
searching for a violation of the single-subject rule, the court looks to
see whether an initiative affects multiple "functions of government. ' '117
This standard, according to one member of the court, is "practically
insurmountable,' 35 and the court has excluded many initiatives from
the ballot for failure to satisfy its demanding single-subject test.3 9
The consequences of different approaches to single-subject rule
interpretation are revealed by the fate of proposals in the respective
states to end affirmative action in state hiring, contracting, and univer-
sity admissions. In California, opponents of the proposal (Proposition
133. Prior to 2000, the California Supreme Court had never overturned an initiative on
single-subject grounds. The court had denied review in two cases in which initiatives had been
invalidated by lower courts for single-subject rule violations. See Chemical Specialties Mfrs.
Ass'n, Inc. v. Deukmejian, 278 Cal. Rptr. 128 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (invalidating California
Proposition 105 (1988), The Public's Right To Know Act, for violating the single-subject rule);
California Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. Eu, 245 Cal. Rptr. 916 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (striking down
prior to the election a tort reform initiative for violation of the single-subject rule), abrogated on
other grounds, Lewis v. Superior Court, 970 P.2d 872 (Cal. 1999). For a discussion of the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's stricter approach toward enforcement of the single-subject rule, and
toward initiative lawmaking, see Gerald F. Uelmen, Taming the Initiative, CALIFORNIA LAW-
YER, Aug. 2000, at 46.
134. See FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3 ("The power to propose the revision or amendment of
any portion or portions of this constitution by initiative is reserved to the people, provided that,
any such revision or amendment, except for those limiting the power of government to raise
revenue, shall embrace but one subject and matter directly connected therewith.").
135. See id.
136. Fine v. Firestone, 448 So. 2d 984, 989 (Fla. 1984).
137. Id. at 990.
138. Justice Leander Shaw criticized the strictness of the "function of government" test in a
concurring opinion in Evans v. Firestone, 457 So. 2d 1351, 1360 (Shaw, J., concurring) (1984).
139. See, e.g., Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General re Right of Citizens to Choose
Health Care Providers, 705 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1998); Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General re
Fish and Wildlife Conservation Comm'n: Unifies Marine Fisheries and Game and Fresh Water
Fish Comm'ns, 705 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. 1998); Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General re
Requirement for Adequate Public Education Funding, 703 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 1997); Advisory
Opinion to the Attorney General re People's Property Rights Amendments Providing Compen-
sation for Restricting Real Property Use May Cover Multiple Subjects, and Advisory Opinion to
the Attorney General re Voter Approval Required for New Taxes, and Advisory Opinion to the
Attorney General re Property Rights, 699 So. 2d 1304 (Fla. 1997).
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209 of 1996) never challenged the measure in state court on single-
subject grounds. They likely assumed that it easily satisfied the state
supreme court's liberal interpretation of the single-subject rule. In
Florida, however, pro-affirmative action forces capitalized on the state
supreme court's strict reading of the single-subject rule to kill a
Proposition 209 clone. Even after sponsor Ward Connerly divided his
anti-affirmative action proposal into four separate initiatives,14 ° the
Florida Supreme Court held that each violated the stringent "function
of government" test for enforcing the state's single subject rule.'
The court thus blocked the initiatives from reaching the ballot.
The way a court interprets a state's single-subject rule has
tremendous substantive impact. It is clear, for example, that if the
Washington Supreme Court were to apply rigorous, Florida-style
single-subject review to 1-200 of 1998 (Washington's anti-affirmative
action initiative), the initiative would not survive because 1-200, like
its Florida counterparts, affects "multiple functions of government."
Strict judicial enforcement of a state single-subject rule can indeed
create a "practically insurmountable" barrier to initiative lawmaking.
In the past, Florida's approach was anomalous. Courts in most
initiative states sought to give deference to initiative lawmaking, and
interpreted single-subject rules and other formal requirements liber-
ally in order to protect the initiative process. In recent years, however,
a discernible shift away from this approach has occurred; several state
supreme courts have signaled that they want to put teeth into their
state's single-subject rule or related limitations on initiative lawmak-
ing. Consider the following examples.
140. In an attempt to satisfy the Florida Supreme Court's strict reading of the state's
single-subject rule, Connerly divided his proposal to end affirmative action based on race into
four initiatives. One was directed at public education, a second at pubic employment, and a
third at public contracting. The fourth initiative targeted affirmative action based on gender as
well as race in public education, employment, and construction. See William Yardley, Drive to
Alter Race Rules Advances, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 27, 1999, at lB.
141. See Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General re Amendment to Bar Government
from Treating People Differently Based on Race in Public Education, 25 FLA. L. WEEKLY 546,
2000 Fla. LEXIS 1460, "1, *27-29 (Fla. 2000); Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General re
Amendment to Bar Government from Treating People Differently Based on Race in Public
Employment, id.; Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General re Amendment to Bar Government
from Treating People Differently Based on Race in Public Contracting, id.; Advisory Opinion to
the Attorney General re End Governmental Discrimination and Preferences Amendment, id.
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A. Changing Interpretations of Single Subject and "Separate Vote"
Rules in Other States
In 1994, Colorado enacted a single subject rule for initiatives.1 42
Since then, when reviewing initiatives, the state supreme court has
aggressively enforced the rule, much more rigorously than it has
enforced the rule for legislative acts,' and much to the dismay of
initiative advocates. 144  Many Colorado initiatives have faced pre-
election single-subject challenges in the past six years, and in the vast
majority of the cases, the court has held they violate the single-subject
rule. 14 1
In 1998, the Oregon Supreme Court dusted off a never-before
invoked constitutional requirement that each amendment to the
constitution requires a separate vote, 146 using it to invalidate Measure
40, a crime victim's rights initiative. 147  The court indicated that it
would enforce the separate vote requirement for initiated constitu-
tional amendments by analyzing the extent to which the measure
would modify the constitution. 148  The effect of this new approach is
142. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-106.5 (2000).
143. See Campbell, supra note 127.
144. See Campbell v. Buckley, 203 F.3d 738, 746-47 (10th Cir. 2000) (rejecting petitioners'
claim that the state applies the single-subject requirement in a manner that discriminates against
certain proponents on the basis of the content of their initiatives).
145. Id. See, e.g., In re Title, Ballot Title and Submission Clause, and Summary for 1999-
2000 No. 41, 975 P.2d 180 (Colo. 1999); In re Title, Ballot Title and Submission Clause, and
Summary for 1997-1998 No. 86, 962 P.2d 245 (Colo. 1998); In re Title, Ballot Title and
Submission Clause, and Summary for 1997-1998 No. 4, 961 P.2d 456 (Colo. 1998); In re Title,
Ballot Title and Submission Clause, and Summary for 1997-1998 No. 30, 959 P.2d 822 (Colo.
1998); In re Title, Ballot Title and Submission Clause, and Summary for 1997-1998 No. 95, 960
P.2d 1204 (Colo. 1998); Matter of Title, Ballot Title and Submission Clause, and Summary for
1997-1998 No. 64, 960 P.2d 1192 (Colo. 1998); In re Title, Ballot Title, Submission Clause, and
Summary Adopted April 5, 1995, by the Title Board Pertaining to a Proposed Initiative "Public
Rights in Waters II," 898 P.2d 1076 (Colo. 1995).
146. See OR. CONST. art. XVII, § 1 ("When two or more amendments shall be submitted
in the manner aforesaid to the voters of this state at the same election, they shall be so submitted
that each amendment shall be voted on separately.").
147. See Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 959 P.2d 49, 63 (Or. 1998). The court established a new
three-prong test for enforcing the separate vote requirement: "the proper inquiry is to determine
whether, [1] if adopted, the proposal would make two or more changes to the constitution that
[2] are substantive and that [3] are not closely related." Id. at 64. The court noted, "In some
instances, it will be clear from the test of the proposed initiative whether it runs afoul of Article
XVII, section 1. In other instances, it will be necessary to examine the implications of the
proposal before determining whether it contains two or more amendments." Id. Here, although
the initiative purported to amend only Article 1 of the constitution, the court said it changed five
existing sections of the constitution that encompassed six, separate individual rights. Id. at 67.
In addition, the court concluded (without articulating a test) that the changes were "substantive."
Id. Finally, the court held that the changes were not closely related. Id.
148. Id. at 60.
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that in Oregon, it will now be more difficult to use the initiative
process to amend the constitution than to enact statutes. 149
Shortly thereafter, the Montana Supreme Court invalidated CI-
75, an initiative that sought to require voter approval for tax increases,
on the basis that the measure violated the state constitution's separate
vote requirement.5 The court's ruling expressly departed from the
old rule set forth in 1914 in State ex rel. Hay v. Alderson' that
constitutional amendments need only have a "unity of subject," and
instead adopted the more stringent standard that the Oregon Supreme
Court set forth the year before in Armatta v. Kitzhaber"S
In California, which has a long history of liberal single-subject
rule interpretation,'5 3 the supreme court last year signaled a significant
change in approach. In Senate of California v. Jones,"5 4 prior to the
election, the court invalidated Proposition 24 (a measure to reduce
legislators' salaries and strip the legislature of power over redistrict-
ing).55 for violating the single-subject rule. Although the court
retained the "reasonably germane" standard, it applied the standard
more strictly than in the past."5 6 In dissent, Justice Kennard noted
that "[n] ever before has this court invalidated an initiative measure for
violation of the single-subject rule"'57 and argued that the court was
149. Id. Note that Oregon constitutional initiatives passed prior to Armatta v. Kitzhaber
are vulnerable to this attack. On July 20, 2001, a circuit judge in Marion County, Oregon
invalidated Oregon's 1992 term limits initiative (Measure 3) on the basis that it violated the state
constitution's separate vote requirement. Lawyers in Oregon are planning to file similar chal-
lenges to several other long-standing voter-approved constitutional initiatives. See Ashbel S.
Green & Lisa Grace Lednicer, Judge Overturns Term Limits, THE OREGONIAN, July 21, 2001, at
A-1. See also Philip Bentley, Note, Armatta v. Kitzhaber: A New Test Safeguarding the Oregon
Constitution from Amendment by Initiative, 78 OR. L. REV. 1139 (1999).
150. Marshall v. State ex rel. Cooney, 975 P.2d 325, 331 (Mont. 1999) (holding that the
initiative amended three parts of the constitution and was therefore invalid). The Montana
separate vote requirement is contained in Article XIV, section 11 of the Montana Constitution.
151. 142 P. 210, 213 (Mont. 1914).
152. 959 P.2d 49 (Or. 1998). In rejecting Montana's former, more liberal standard, the
Marshall court held that
the unity of subject rule that the court applied in Hay and Cooney is unworkable.
Under the Court's rationale in Hay, for example, a constitutional initiative to
"improve Montana's government" could amend virtually every part of Montana's
constitution but have one single subject. The unity of subject rule set forth in Hay
and Cooney is so elastic that it could swallow Montana's entire Constitution. We
decline to affirm such a rule.
975 P.2d at 331. "To the extent that this holding is in conflict with Hay, Teague, and Cooney,
those decisions are overruled." Id.
153. See supra notes 132, 133 and accompanying text.
154. 988 P.2d 1089, 1105 (Cal. 1999).
155. Id. at 1091-92.
156. Id. at 1100-05.
157. Id. at 1106 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
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abandoning judicial restraint and making a precipitous shift away
from the former, more liberal approach.' 8
These examples all point in the same direction: Courts in several
initiative states are moving in the "initiative watchdog" direction by
more strictly enforcing single-subject rules and related requirements.
B. Washington's Enforcement of the Single Subject Rule
Last year, in Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587 v. State, the
Washington Supreme Court invalidated 1-695, in part because it
violated the state's single-subject rule as set forth in Article II, section
19.' In its opinion, the court did not suggest that it was establishing
a new, more stringent standard for single-subject review. Like the
California Supreme Court, the Washington Supreme Court applied its
old, "liberal" standard in a new, more aggressive way. The Washing-
ton Supreme Court applies a two-tiered standard of single-subject
review, depending on whether the initiative's title is "general" or"restrictive."' For general titles, the court applies a "rational unity
test" in which all that is required is a rational unity between the
general subject and the incidental subjects.' Restrictive titles are not
regarded as liberally as a general title for purposes of single-subject
review. 62 In Amalgamated Transit, the court held that 1-695 had a
general title,'63 and therefore was entitled to the less strict "rational
unity" test. Nevertheless, the court held that 1-695 failed to meet the
test in that no rational unity existed between the subjects of the
initiative. 164
1-695 sought to reduce vehicle license fees to $30 and to require
voter approval for future increases in taxes and fees.'65 Attorneys for
Mr. Eyman and the State argued that the single subject of the measure
was "limiting taxation," and argued that all the provisions of 1-695 are
rationally related to the general subject of limiting taxation. 166 The
court rejected that argument and struck down the initiative.
158. Id. at 1111 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
159. 142 Wash. 2d 183, 11 P.3d 762 (2000).
160. See Amalgamated Transit, 142 Wash. 2d at 206-12, 11 P.3d at 780-83.
161. Id. at 209, 11 P.3d at 782.
162. Id. at 210, 11 P.3d at 782. A "restrictive title" is defined as "one where a particular
part or branch of a subject is carved out and selected as the subject of the legislation." Id. (quot-
ing State v. Broadaway, 133 Wash. 2d 118, 129, 942 P.2d 363 (1997)).
163. Id. at 216, 11 P.3d at 786.
164. Id. at 217, 11 P.3d at 786.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 212, 11 P.3d at 783.
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Justice Sanders, in dissent, objected to the court's strict applica-
tion of the single subject rule to this initiative.167 He noted that in
Fritz v. Gorton,'68 the court held that Initiative 276 of 1972 satisfied
the single-subject rule.169 This was so, even though the challengers to
1-276 maintained and the dissent agreed that the initiative contained a"'multitude of subjects,' including: (1) disclosure of campaign financ-
ing; (2) limitations on campaign spending; (3) regulation of lobbying
activities; (4) regulation of grass-roots educational activities; (5)
disclosure of financial affairs of elected officials; and (6) public inspec-
tion of public records."'' 71 In Fritz, the court went out of its way to
hold that the six components of the initiative were unified by the
"generic subject" of "openness in government. '"171
Justice Sanders could justifiably argue that the tax-limiting pro-
visions of 1-695 were at least as unified in a common "subject" as were
the political reform provisions of 1-276. Placing Fritz side-by-side
with Amalgamated Transit, it is apparent that the Washington
Supreme Court enforced the single-subject rule more strictly in the
latter case.
The differing outcomes suggest two possibilities. The court may
be applying the single-subject rule in an uneven manner, using it to
strike down only those initiatives it dislikes (i.e., Populist-oriented
measures like 1-695), but not the Progressive-oriented initiatives it
favors.'72 Alternatively, it could signal that the court is seeking to
constrain initiative lawmaking generally, by more strictly interpreting
the single-subject rule and other related constitutional limitations on
the initiative process. Either way, the court in Amalgamated Transit
was playing the watchdog, baring its teeth, and signaling to Populists
like Tim Eyman that it will resist their battering rams.
VI. POTENTIAL RISKS FOR THE COURT
The same Populist impulse that delights in initiative lawmaking
is repulsed by judicial review. In the Populist mind, judicial review
raises the specter of arrogant, elitist, insular judges usurping power
from popularly elected legislators, or, even worse, from the people
167. Id. at 264-65, 11 P.3d at 810 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
168. 83 Wash. 2d 275, 517 P.2d 911 (1974).
169. See Amalgamated Transit, 142 Wash. 2d at 264-65, 11 P.3d at 810 (Sanders, J.,
dissenting).
170. Fritz, 83 Wash. 2d at 290, 338, 517 P.2d at 920, 947 (Rosselini, J., dissenting).
171. See Amalgamated Transit, 142 Wash. 2d at 264-65, 11 P.3d at 810 (citing Fritz, 83
Wash. 2d at 290, 517 P.2d 911 (Sanders, J., dissenting)).
172. Professor Julian Eule advocated this very sort of differential treatment. See Eule,
supra note 11, at 1558-73.
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themselves. Pressure on the courts grows when judges overturn "the
will of the people" as directly expressed through the initiative process,
and the risk of backlash is most acute for state court judges, especially
in states like Washington where judges have to face voters in contested
elections. 173
If the Washington initiative process is in fact becoming
dominated by Populist entrepreneurs who seek to undermine repre-
sentative government, and if state courts are in fact increasingly
assuming an "initiative watchdog" role, aggressively invalidating
Populist-oriented initiatives, it does not take much imagination to see
how the conflict could turn ugly. The same Populist impulse (and
campaign industry) that drives initiative campaigns can be enlisted to
defeat watchdog judges. If the court becomes more politicized, its
legitimacy, independence, and capacity to protect representative gov-
ernment, minority interests, and individual rights may erode. At that
point, the Populist ideal of the unmediated power of the people will
have moved a step closer to realization. Populism will have under-
mined not only the legislature, but the courts as well.
173. See generally Gerald F. Uelmen, Crocodiles in the Bathtub: Maintaining the Independ-
ence of the Supreme Courts in an Era of Judicial Politicization, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1133
(1997).
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